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ABSTRACT
The outcomes of "The Future of UAS: Standards,
Regulations and Operational Experiences" workshop,
held on the 7 -8 December 2006, in Brisbane,
Queensland, Australia. The goal of the workshop was to
identify recent international activities in the Unmanned
Airborne Systems (UAS) airspace integration problem.
The workshop attracted a broad cross-section of the UAS
community, including: airspace and safety regulators,
developers, operators, and researchers. The three themes
of discussion were: progress in the development of
standards and regulations; lessons learnt from recent
operations; and advances in new technologies. This
summarises the activities of the workshop and explores
the important outcomes and trends as perceived by these
authors.
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AOPA Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association
ARCAA: Australian Research Centre for
Aerospace Automation
ATC:
ATM:
ASTM:
C3:
CASA:
CAR:
CASR:
CONOPS:
CNS:
CRM:
CSIRO:
DSA:
ELOS:
EASA:
Air Traffic Control
Air Traffic Management
American Society for Testing and
Materials
Command, Control and Communication
Civil Aviation Safety Authority
Civil Aviation Regulations
Civil Aviation Safety Regulations
Concept of Operations
Communications, Navigation, Surveillance
Crew Resource Management
Australian Commonwealth Scientific and
Industrial Research Organization
Detect Sense and Avoid
Equivalent Level of Safety
European Aviation Safety Agency
EUROCAE: European Organisation for Civil
Aviation Equipment
FAA: Federal Aviation Administration
GAT: General Air Traffic
GCS: Ground Control Station
H1'LH Human-Machine Interface
ICAO: International Civil Aviation Organization
LATS: Low Altitude Threat Simulator
LOC: Loss of Command
LSA: Light-Sport Aircraft
LRLS: Long Range Lineup System
MAAA: Model Aeronautical Association of Australia
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MASPS: Minimum Aviation System Performance
Standards
NAS: National Airspace System
NIPA:
NPRM:
OAT:
RNIP:
RSVM:
RTCA:
SAFD:
SARPS:
SUAS:
SDOs:
SMEs:
UAV:
UAS:
UMTS: Universal Mobile Telecommunications System
INTRODUCTION
Currently one of the biggest challenges faced by the
Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS 1) industry, are the
restrictions in integrating operations into civilian airspace.
These restrictions are generally imposed by the current
regulatory environment, a lack of operational experience, and
some fundamental deficiencies in UAS technology.
Stakeholder collaboration and coordination is fundamental to
overcoming these difficulties.
In late 2005, the Australian Research Centre for
Aerospace Automation (ARCAA') hosted its first "The
Future of UAS" workshop, focusing on the "Challenges and
Applications in the Asia Pacific Region. " The workshop
attracted a broad cross-section of the UAS community and
the ensuing discussions identified three key issues faced by
the AsiaPacific UAS industry, these were:
1) The lack of prescriptive standards and
regulations governing the routine operation of
UAS in the civilian airspace system.
2) The inability to obtain adequate insurance
coverage for UAS operations.
3) The general lack of industry and public
awareness of the potential applications for UAS.
Driven by the outcomes of the 2005 workshop, themes for
the 2006 workshop explored recent developments of
standards and regulations, lessons learnt from operational
'ARCAA is a joint venture between the Queensland Uni versity of Technology and the
Commonwealth Scientific Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), Information
Communication and Technology (ICT) Centre.
Advance-Notice of Proposed Amendment
Notice of Proposed Rule Making
Operational Air Traffic
Required Navigation Performance
Reduced Separation Vertical Minima
Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics
See & Avoid Elight Demonstration
Standards and Recommended Practices
Small UAS
Standards Developing Organizations
Small to Medium Enterprise
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
Unmanned Aerial System
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experiences, and advances in UAS technology. More
specifically, the goals of this workshop were to:
1) Review and comment on emerging standards
such as those for detect, sense and avoid, human
machine interface (HMI), and operator training;
2) ldentify common problems in the integration of
UAS into the National Airspace System (NAS)
and operations across international bodies;
3) Understand how the requirement for equivalent
evel of safety can be (and is currently being)
resolved for UAS;
4) Understand lessons learnt from Australian UAS
trials in civil airspace (restricted and otherwise);
and
5) Raise the level of awareness within the potential
user community.
The workshop comprised a series of presentations from
international experts, followed by short moderated
workshops to stimulate open floor discussion on major
issues. This summarises the activities of the workshop and
explores the key outcomes and trends as perceived by the
authors.
STANDARDS AND REGULATIONS
The standards and regulations theme contained
presentations from representatives of international regulatory
authorities and standards development organisations
including: EUROCONTROL, CASA, ASTM F-38,
EUROCAE UAV Working Group 73 (WG-73), and RTCA
Special Committee 203 (SC-203). Spectrum issues for UAS
were covered by the Australian Department of Defence.
EUROCONTROL - MILITARY UAS AS OAT
The first presentation of the session was from Wing
Commander Mike Strong, Directorate of Civil-Military Air
Traffic Management (ATM) Coordination,
EUROCONTROL, and Chairman of the EUROCONTROL
UAV-Operational Air Traffic (OAT) Task Force.
The objective of the UAV-OAT Task Force, and subject
of the presentation, was the ongoing development of
high-level and generic specifications for the use of military
UAS as OAT outside of segregated airspace (operating under
non-ICAG internationally agreed processes). Specifications
concerning collision avoidance, provision of air services, and
separation minima were presented. The principles employed
by the Task Force were:
That military UAS operating as OAT should not
present a risk to other airspace users greater than
30
that presented by existing manned military
aircraft operating as OAT outside segregated
airspace;.
* That operations involving military UAS as OAT
should be transparent to air service providers
and other airspace users, and
" The operation of military UAS as OAT should
not deny or reduce the access which other users
have to airspace.
The specifications were released for public consultation in
April 2006 under the EUROCONTROL Notice of Proposed
Rule-Making (ENPRM) process. At the time of the
workshop, a report summ-arising the 273 comments and
recommendations obtained over the period of public
consultation was soon to be released. The amended
specifications, which incorporate many of the responses
received through the ENPRM consultative process were
released early in 2007.
Discussion
It is important to note that the specifications defined by the
Task Force do not address the issues concerning the
operation of civilian UAS, or military UAS operating as
General Air Traffic (GAT) under ICAO civil rules. It was
also interesting that the specifications developed by the Task
Force were not constrained by the capability or performance
of current UAS (specifically, the current lack of a suitable
sense-and-avoid technology), an issue which tends to
dominate discussions in the area of UAS integration. The
specifications, although intentionally non-prescriptive, are a
step forward in the direction of addressing the UAS airspace
integration problem.
ASTM - UNMANNED AVIATION STANDARDS
Discussion on the definition of standards pertaining to
UAS airworthiness commenced with a presentation made by
Laurence Newcomne, representative of the ASTM
International's Unmanned Aviation Standards Committee
F38. The presentation provided a brief introduction to the
ASTM F38 Committee, a survey of international Standards
Developing Organisations (SDOs) and outlined the ASTM
UAS standards roadmap.
The ASTM is a consensus standards body [1] and the
objective of the F38 Committee is to "... . produce
cost-effective consensus standards that, when applied, will
enhance the safe design, manufacture, maintenance, and
operation of UASs. "
To achieve this objective the ASTM standards roadmap
was established. The roadmap is a hierarchical structure of
standards and is intended to be used by organisations
engaged in developing or adopting standards governing UAS
design, manufacture, test, training, operation, and
maintenance. The roadmap also served to identify gaps and
duplication in existing standards.
At the highest level, the ASTM roadmap of categorises
standards into:
1) Airworthiness Standards - Predominantly
hardware-oriented standards where the focus is
on the safe design, construction, test,
modification, and inspection of the individual
component, aircraft, or system. Airworthiness
standards are then further decomposed into
standards relating to airframe, avionics, and
propulsion.
2) Operations Standards - Standards where the
focus is on the safe employment of the system
within the aviation environment among other
aircraft and systems. These standards are
predominantly procedure- and performance-
oriented and are further decomposed into
standards relating to general, flight, and ground
operations.
3) Qualifications Standards - Procedure-oriented
standards focussed on the safe practices by the
individuals responsible for employing the
system. The qualification standards are further
decomposed into crew, maintainers, and
operators.
As part of the roadmap process, the comprehensive review
of all existing standards revealed a number of deficiencies,
including:
1) Standards relating to unconventional takeoff
and landing systems such as catapults
(pneumatic, hydraulic, bungee, etc.), and
arresting gear (net, wires, and halyards).
2) Standards relating to the security of the
command, control, and data links.
3) Armed UASs; specifically standards relating to
the deployment, carriage, release, and safety of
munitions onboard a UAS.
4) 7The use ofphotovoltaic cells (solar cells) and
fuel cells as aviation power plants.
5) Standards on the design and operation of
automated take-off and landing systems.
6) The accommodation of UASs at alternate
airfields.
It was indicated that a credible transparent process is
required to develop standards to address these deficiencies.
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Additionally a substantial amount of testing and experience is
needed to build a high degree of confidence in a set of
standards. However under the current regulatory environment
it is difficult to obtain the operational experience necessary
for credible standards development. An expected solution to
this problem is the utilisation of approved modelling and
simulation tools as a means of validating standards. One such
airspace modelling tool, outlined at length in the
presentation, is the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology/Lincoln Lab, Collision Avoidance System Safety
Assessment Tool (CASSAT).
The presentation concluded by providing an overview of
the Office of Secretary of Defence (OSD) See and Avoid
Flight Demonstration (SAID) program. The primary
objective of this program is the development and
demonstration of an autonomous collision avoidance
capability on a UAS operating outside of segregated airspace.
The experience gained throughout the program will be used
to refine standards (ASTM 2411) for autonomous collision
avoidance capabilities and to map the airworthiness
certification process for collision avoidance systems.
Standards development is an iterative process, and thus
programs such as the OSD SAFD will have an important part
in the development of credible standards for UASs.
Discussion
UAS standards development is a global problem and the
issues concerning harmonisation and coordination among
international parties may prove to be the ultimate obstacle to
realising globally recognised standards for UAS.
The ASTM UAS standards roadmap, is one tool which
could potentially overcome these issues. The roadmap
establishes the framework from which to construct standards,
and identifies deficiencies, allowing for better coordination
and allocation of resources in the refinement and
development of standards. Global consensus on the structure
of such a roadmap is essential to the timely and efficient
development of standards and promotes a "collaborate
rather than compete" environment.
Social-political influences will be an important factor in
any regulatory process. Acknowledging this fact and
embracing tools (such as roadmaps) at an early stage in the
regulatory process will be key to the timely and efficient
development of acceptable standards.
EUROCAE - WORKING GROUP 73 UPDATE
The European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment
(EUROCAE) is an international association focussing on the
development of standards and regulations for UAS. Subgroup
Leader and Leadership Team Member for the EUROCAE
UAV Working Group 73 (WG-73), Michelle Allouche,
provided a presentation which outlined their progress in UAS
standards development.
WG-73 was formed in May 2006 with the overall
objective of developing technical materials that would
support UAS airworthiness certification and operational
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approval criteria, enabling the safe operation of UAS in
non-segregated airspace. The overarching principle
governing the first phase of WG-73 activities is that UAS and
manned aircraft must be treated equally within the existing
Air Traffic Management (ATM) environment.
The second phase of proposed activities recognises that
imposing manned aircraft equivalence on the UAS industry
may result in a non-optimal solution. This phase seeks to
identify new and more efficient processes for integrating
UAS and manned aircraft (where UAS are not treated
equivalently to manned aircraft).
The presentation provided some background on
EUROCAE, the WG-73 working group, and an update on the
progress and future work areas of WG-73. WG-73 activities
are divided into three areas:
1) UA V Operations - The identification of various
UAS missions within non-segregated airspace,
functional and equipment requirements for
these operations, their impact on other aviation
activities, and the requirements for
sense-and-avoid.
2) UA V Airworthiness - Addressing the issues
concerning the definition of safety targets,
airworthiness certification categories,
considerations for special conditions/
restrictions on the operation of UAS, and the
ongoing airworthiness of UAS systems.
3) UA V Communications, Spectrum, Command
and Control, and Security - Addressing the
issues concerning the spectrum, security, and
requirements for the command, control, and
telemetry links for ground and airborne systems.
Given the recent formation of EUROCAB WG-73 the
presentation focussed on their aims and objectives rather than
definitive specifications.
Discussion
Rather than simply focussing on the definition of
standards, or the direct adoption of the existing aviation
regulatory framework to UAS, the EUROCAF WG-73 has
taken on a more holistic approach to the problem. WG-73 has
started to address the problem from its fundamentals and is
investigating important issues such as:
1) The definition of metrics and benchmarks
describing the requirement for an Equivalent
Level of Safety (ELOS);
2) The definition of UAS certification categories,
and;
3) The application of operational restrictions in
conjunction with prescriptive regulations.
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EUROCAE WG-73 acknowledges that the solution to the
effective regulation of UAS may not be in the application of
the existing "off-the-shelf' regulatory frameworks. Thus it is
important that organisations such EUROCAE WG-73
continue to think outside of the box and challenge the issues
which bound current thinking on the regulation of UAS.
RTCA - SC203, UAS STANDARD
DEVELOPM[ENT ACTIVITIES
Cary Spitzer from RTCA Special Committee 203
(SC-203) presented a third perspective on the UAS standards
development problem. With strong participation by the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), industry, and many
alphabet organizations including the Aircraft Owners and
Pilots Association (AOPA), the objective of the RTCA
SC-203 is to support the need of US industry and
Government to operate UAS safely in the NAS with no
impact to current users. The initial focus of the Conmmittee
has been on the development of recommendations that will
facilitate these operations.
RTCA Standards development is currently focussed on the
definition of Minimum Aviation System Performance
Standards (MASPS) for UAS in general, Command Control
and Communications (C3), and Detect, Sense and Avoid
(DSA) systems. The high level strategy governing the
development of standards is to:
1) Collect operational concepts representing
current and future UAS operations.
2) To assess each concept of operation with the
objective of identifying the unique attributes of
the systems and the operation.
3) Determine the ability of the NAS to tolerate the
unique attributes and characteristics of the
different UAS concepts of operation without
adversely impacting safety or efficiency.
4) Establish system level functional and
performance requirements based on tolerable
UAS performance, and;
5) Continue to decompose these functional, safety
and performance requirements to the subsystem
level.
As a pre-cursor to the generation of MASPS, a UAS
general guidance document was completed in March 2007
[I1I]. The document provides the framework for developing
standards and guides the concepts of UAS operation, the
operational environment and the key issues which need to be
considered in the definition of MASPS. SC-203 is now
concentrating on the establishment of the baseline and scope
for the planned standards development activities.
Discussion
Key points raised in the presentation were the need for
continued momentum in the development of technologies,
policies, and regulations concerning the integration of UAS
into the NAS. In addition, this momentum must come from
all stakeholders in civil airspace and that domestic (United
States) activities should be coordinated with international
programs.
It was identified that there was some collaboration
occurring between SC-203 and WG-73.
AUSTRALIAN DOD - AERONAUTICAL
SPECTRUM AVAILABILITY
George Wardle, Manager of Radio Spectrum Planning,
Australian Department of Defence, discussed the present
availability of Aeronautical Telemetry spectrum in Australia.
An allocation exists between 1435 - 1535 MHz and although
priority is given to aviation users, this band is also available
for non-aeronautical users through a licensing arrangement.
It was indicated that these bands are insufficient for
current and future Australian requirements and are also likely
reduced as competition for spectrum with other industry
sectors is fierce. For example it was claimed that there are
over 2 billion mobile phone users internationally compared to
the few 1000 potential telemetry users in the UAS
community. This was seen as a significant hurdle for the
UAS industry.
Worldwide radio-frequency is managed at the treaty level
through a specialised agency of the UN, the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU). In 1992, the ITU
reallocated some of the spectrum originally used for
aeronautical telemetry to the broadcasting service.
Subsequent studies found that the two users could not
co-exist and consequently aeronautical telemetry suffered as
a result.
Currently there are a number of new bands under
consideration for reallocation to aeronautical telemetry
(above 3 GHz only). All bands between 3 and 6.7 GHz for
instance that have already been allocated to the mobile
service are available, but not exclusively for aeronautical
telemetry purposes. Other bands under consideration are
4400-4900 MHz, 5030-5091 MHz, 5091-5050 MHz,
5 150-5250 MHz and 5925-6700 MHz. The first four bands
require regulatory changes to implement and there is no
guarantee that all will be available as these will be shared
with other applications.
This situation was seen as a major impediment to UAS
and in particular civil UAS. Spectrum planning at the
international level occurs on a 7 year cycle with discussions
next occurring in 2007. Unless a favourable outcome is
obtained, there will be a 7 year wait before a dedicated UAS
spectrum allocation can again be requested.
The presentation concluded that the availability of
appropriate spectrum is a vital aspect of operating UAS.
Properly designed links and the use of interference mitigation
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techniques are important to maximise safety. Wardle
indicated that it is important to secure the required spectrum
early in the design process as spectrum is a very limited
commodity.
Discussion
Although coordination occurs at a global level, currently
UAS are operating in a variety of spectrum allocations. This
results in a lack of interoperability when operating UAS on
an international basis. This highlights the importance of
developing specific spectrum allocation for UAS aeronautical
telemetry.
Given that spectrum is a finite resource the UAS
community must address methods of reducing their
communication requirements through increased onboard
automation and intelligence. This would allow the UAS to
transmit highly digested mission data, rather than all of the
raw data, reducing the overall bandwidth required. However,
there are numerous technical and regulatory challenges in
realising highly autonomous and intelligent UAS. For
example current CASA regulations require continuous
real-time communications links.
The greatest competitor for spectrum is the mobile
telephony industry. Perhaps the UAS industry should adopt
the "if you can't beat 'em -join 'em " philosophy and
investigate how UAS can utilise puiblic mobile data networks.
In Australia these services can currently provide downlink
rates of over 3.6Mbps with a stated coverage to over 98% of
the population of Australia.
SUMMARY
It is widely recognised that the absence of regulations for
UAS is a significant challenge and that progress is being
made towards a solution/s. However, the promulgation of
ineffectual or inappropriate regulations could present an even
bigger threat to the UAS industry, and despite the perceived
urgency in the need for standards and regulations the industry
will have to proceed with caution. Based on this statement,
the following observations and comments are made:
1) There are many issues at the foundation of the
UAS regulatory problem which are yet to be
resolved. It is important that there is complete
understanding and consensus on the issues such
as the definition of ELOS requirements (if
indeed this is an appropriate mechanism for
developing requirements) which underpin the
entire regulation development effort.
2) Regulators and associations concerned with the
development of regulations, should
acknowledge that the most effective solution to
the regulation of UAS may lie outside the
bounds of existing approaches and
methodologies. UAS are a fundamentally new
aviation technology, the regulation of which
may require a fundamentally new approach.
3) Diversity in approaches helps to ensure that all
potential avenues for regulatory development
are explored; however, this can contribute to the
problems of harmonisation and interoperability
of regulations.
4) It is important to recognise that the current
airspace system was designed from the outset
with a single user in mind; manned aircraft. The
airspace system has evolved and continues to
evolve, however evolution should consider the
future role unmanned aviation will have within
the aviation environment and their relative
position within the aviation industry. The
current guiding principles of conformance and
transparency of UAS operations are logical and
valid. However, in the long term, such guiding
principles may preclude the exploration of safer
and more efficient airspace systems (and
regulations) developed with both manned and
unmanned users in mind.
5) Finally, in order to ensure the harmonisation
and uniform acceptance of standards and
regulations it is imperative that from the outset
all stakeholders have an active role in
development programs and associations.
Decisions made today with respect to the direction and
form UAS regulations will take, will ultimately decide the
future of the industry. In relation to the further development
of UAS regulations and standards in Australia, it is important
to identify the unique aspects of the Australian operating
environment. These aspects include the airspace and
terrestrial environments, the stakeholders, the potential
markets, the legislative processes, and the social, cultural,
and political climates. The development of regulations
indigenous to Australia is unlikely and therefore careful
consideration should be given in the application of
international standards and regulations within the Australian
context.
The current regulations adopted by CASA positions
Australia as a likely leader in UAS technologies over the
short term. It was felt that it would take 2-3 years before the
US or Europe would have a similar level of UAS operational
freedom. It is likely that the timely introduction of even more
flexible UAS regulations within Australia will only come
about through continued stakeholder demand.
OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCES
AND AIRWORTHINESS
The second workshop theme focused on the lessons learnt
from recent operational experiences, UAS training,
airworthiness programs, and approvals for UAS operations.
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Presentations were provided by the Australian Department of
Defence (DoD)), the Airworthiness Coordination and Policy
Agency (ACPA), the Defence Science and Technology
Organisation (DSTO), the Directorate General Technical
Airworthiness (DGTA), the Royal Australian Navy (RAN),
Aerosonde, BAE Systems Australia, and the Indian Centre
for Air Power Studies.
DSTO - North-West Shelf Trials
Shane Dunn from the DSTO, Air Vehicles Division,
discussed the North-West Shelf trials conducted in
September 2006 and their associated airworthiness
considerations. The purpose of the trials were to assess the
surveillance potential of a UAS and a patrol boat working
together, to demonstrate a component of an integrated
national surveillance network. The trials assisted the Air
7000 acquisition program through the provision of
operational experience in the deployment of a Mariner
demonstrator UAS, and the simulated operation of a Global
Hawk UAS.
The Mariner UAS, registered as a State aircraft, conducted
a number of operations out of RAAF base Edinburgh,
Adelaide. After a series of test flights off the coast of RAAF
Edinburgh, the Mariner was flown over land to RAAF base
Learmonth. This required operations in Class G airspace.
There were two major challenges that needed to be addressed
in these trials:
1) The UAS did not comply with see-and-avoid
requirements, and;
2) The system still needs to be certified as being
technically airworthy and thus presented a risk
to people and property on the ground. In
addition this added to the complexity of the air
traffic management process.
To overcome these challenges a number of risk mitigation
techniques were introduced. The measures put in place to
reduce the risk of a midair collision were to:
1) Where practicable, conduct flight under IFR and
operate on IFR levels.
2) Where practicable, conduct flight in controlled
airspace under the oversight of ATC.
3) Where practicable, carry out activities in
military restricted airspace.
4) Where practicable, conduct flying operations in
VMC with navigation strobe lights activated.
5) Where practicable, conduct flying operations
above FLI 10 (as all aircraft utilising this
airspace should be radio and transponder
equipped).
6) Maintain transit flight above FL200 (to avoid
potential conflict with VFR traffic).
7) Establish a mission exclusion zone to ensure
safe separation from typical helicopter
operations between gas and oil rigs.
8) Make use of ground-based observers for
operations in terminal airspace.
9) Operate in class G airspace only where traffic
density could be expected to be "very low."
10) Periodically broadcast position,
altitude, and intentions.
To manage the risks presented to the people and property
on the ground, flights were planned to avoid the over flight of
"4populous" areas and to avoid offshore oil and gas
infrastructure. The lack of RVSM and RNP certification
resulted in complexity in ATM processes, which was
overcome by:
1) Applying a 2000 foot vertical separation for
flight levels above FL290; and
2) Applying 101 nmi lateral separation in OCA.
It was stated that existing airworthiness procedures and
guidelines for piloted military aircraft were tailored to the
trials. Using these measures, the trials were able to obtain the
appropriate approvals from the Australian Defence Force and
Australia's Civil Aviation Safety Authority.
Discussion
As a result of the North-West Shelf Trials, Defence,
CASA, and Airservices Australia have gained valuable
experience. Defence now has a broader understanding of the
complexity of the risk management task in addition to an
appreciation of the capabilities of UAS technologies in
maritime roles. CASA and Airservices Australia also benefit
through experience in the application of regulatory processes.
Despite the absence of prescriptive Airworthiness
standards and DSA, the receptive and cooperative risk
management philosophy in Australia still allowed Defence to
conduct the trial operations. It is interesting to note that the
same operations may not have been possible under FAA
regulations [2]. However, to meet long-term Defence UAS
capability requirements greater freedom in operations is still
needed.
A number of questions were raised with respect to the
precise definitions of "very low" traffic density and
"6populous areas." These definitions leave room for
interpretation and can lead to the inconsistent risk
management of UAS operations.
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RAN - AUSTRALIAN KALKARA OPERATIONS
LCDR Bob Fenry (RAN) and Steve Fendley (5D3sys,
Austin, TX, USA) provided a report on Kalkara UAS (an
aerial target system), focusing on the lessons learnt with the
RAN's Australian operations.
A summary of the primary causes of incident and failure
across all 106 recorded accidents and incidents found that
approximately 56% involved technical/equipment failures
and 16% involved human error. Approximately 23% of
incidents were due to errors in the documented design,
operational and maintenance procedures.
It was observed that the number of accidents and incidents
has fallen significantly since the RAN procured the first
Kalkara aerial target in 1998. Increasing experience in the
operation of Kalkara assisted the RAN to identify a number
of technical and operational improvements in the US
designed system. Some of the lessons learned included:
1) Crew resource management, training and
human machine interface were factors prevalent
in a number of incidents. These issues were
addressed through improved and ongoing
operator training, and the redesign of the
situational awareness and control displays.
2) A number of incidents highlighted the
significance of the differences between the
mission and operational requirements of the
RAN and that of the US. These differences had
ramifications on technical and operational
aspects of the UAS.
3) Safety standards and procedures need to be
defined which are specific to the mission and
operating environment.
4) It is important to take into consideration other
aspects involved in the risk management
process (e.g.; minimising public perception/
apprehension, and risks to the environment)
The main conclusion from the presentation was that all
requirements and design change decisions will have a
number of impacts across a wide number of domains. In
particular, changes in the operational requirements can have
significant impacts on the technical design of the system.
Therefore, to ensure the safety and efficiency of operations, it
is essential that all members (program, operational, user and
technical) be involved in the decision-making process.
Discussion
The ADF's initial step into unmanned systems has been
one of procurement as opposed to development.
Subsequently, a lot can be learned from the experiences
gained in the risk management of the Kalkara. These lessons
are relevant to both Defence and civil/commercial UAS
operations and highlight the complexity and
multi-dimensionality of the risk management task.
Procurement processes should place a strong emphasis on the
unique safety issues involved in the acquisition of existing
technologies and their application to different missions and
operating environments. This will be an important
consideration for upcoming ADF UAS procurements such as
AIR7000 and for future civil/commercial Australian
procurements.
AAI AEROSONDE - AEROSONDE OPERATIONS
Peter Bale and Rich Clifford from AAI Aerosonde
Australia presented an overview of the diverse range of civil
and military operations of the Aerosonde UAS. This
overview detailed the operation of the Aerosonde in varying
concepts of operation, including:
1) Operations in arctic, tropical, desert, and
hurricane conditions.
2) Operations in segregated and non-segregated,
military, and civil airspace.
3) Missions in defence, civil, and commercial
applications.
4) Multi-system operations alongside unmanned
underwater vehicles, human-piloted aircraft,
maritime vessels, and ground assets.
Aerosonde possesses an extensive experience in operating
a high technology, low risk solution for a wide range of
applications. Aerosonde has flown over 1000 hours of "arctic
operations" and was able to obtain a certificate of
airworthiness for their 2006 hurricane demonstration project
(limited to operations under the supervision of NASA).
However, not having sense-and-avoid capability was an issue
for their operations in Guam in November 2005.
Discussion
The presentation highlighted the flexibility and capability
of UAS technologies, particularly those of smaller UAS. It
also highlighted the diversity of potential markets and
applications for UAS. It is interesting to note that despite the
size of the Aerosonde system and the nature of some of its
missions (i.e., arctic missions) the common issues of
regulation, standards, certification, and see-and-avoid still
presented a significant challenge. Many of the operational
trials conducted in Australia might not have been possible in
countries with less receptive risk management policies. These
types of operations build stakeholder awareness of the
capabilities and potential applications for UAS. In addition,
these operations are pivotal to the progressive understanding
of the risks and the effective risk management of UAS
technologies.
36 IEEE A&E SYSTEMS MAGAZINE, NOVEMBER 200736
RAE SYSTEMS AUSTRALIA - OPERATIONS AT
WEST SALE
Heidi Fourie, UAV Operations Specialist at BAE Systems
Australia provided an overview of current and future UAS
operations at West Sale, Victoria, Australia. The presentation
identified the complex challenges that needed to be overcome
in order to establish West Sale as a UAS operations facility.
The key challenges were:
1) The management complexities due to the
operation out of non-segregated military and
civil shared airspace. This required negotiation,
coordination, and approvals/agreements to be
made with multiple airspace stakeholders (e.g.,
CASA, Defence, and local airspace user and
community groups).
2) The operational complexities involved in the
safe flight of UAS alongside military and
general aviation.
3) The sociological complexities concerning
airspace stakeholders. Specifically, how to
provide assurances to regulators, other airspace
users, and the local community that the intended
operations would not have a negative impact
(e.g., safety, access to airspace, etc.).
A number of approaches were adopted to address these
challenges. The first involved the definition of a phased
approach for operations at West Sale which attempted to
minimise the impact on stakeholders whilst, at the same time,
meet the progressive operational needs of BAE Systems. The
phased approach progressively expands the operational
envelope (airspace, and the nature and complexity of the
operation) through demonstrated experience in the safe
operations.
The second and concurrent approach involved extensive
consultation with all stakeholders to identify and address
individual concerns with respect to UAS operations out of
West Sale. This process included ongoing consultation with
RAPAC, RAAF, CASA, and Airservices Australia. As a
result, a number of procedural and operational processes
were put in place to address the concerns identified.
The above approaches assisted BAE Systems in obtaining
a Deed of Agreement with the RAAF and the issuance of an
Operating Approval by CASA for continued operations at
West Sale.
A number of lessons have been learnt as a result of
growing experience in the operation of UAS, these include:
1) Personnel Issues - It is essential that all
personnel have a good background knowledge
of aviation, aviation practices (both mrilitary and
civilian), licenses (minimum of radio), and of
technologies (both UAS and other aviation
technologies). It was also emphasised that this
knowledge and experience would take time to
acquire.
2) Operational Issues - Coordinating between
military, civil, and air traffic service providers is
a complex task. However, all stakeholders
benefit from the experience.
Discussion
The philosophy adopted by BAE Systems is successful as
it addresses the challenges of integrated UAS operations
across a number of domains. Acceptance of routine UAS
operations in shared airspace is not just about getting
regulatory authorisation but is a process which must address
the concerns (whether founded or not) of all stakeholders.
The phased approach allowed all stakeholders (including
BAE Systems) to build confidence in the safety and integrity
of the systems, procedures, and mechanisms in place before
more extensive operations are undertaken.
The open and discursive approach adopted by BAR
Systems has been successful in creating a safe, "cooperate
rather than compete, " operational environment.
CENTRE FOR AIR POWER STUDIES -
INDIAN UAS ACTIVITIES
Wing Commander Rajiv Goyal from the Centre for Air
Power Studies, New Delhi, outlined UAS activities in the
Indian Subcontinent. The presentation covered the scope of
activities within India, Pakistan, and Sri Lankca and
highlighted some unique civilian UAS applications specific
to the region. In particular, there is the potential for UAS in
the management of natural and man-made disasters (e.g.,
tsunamis and industrial pollution, respectively).
One of the most significant challenges has been the lack of
recognition of UAS capabilities within government and
regulatory bodies in the region. Currently, UAS are not
defined by the Indian civil aviation regulatory authority and
there is limited government support of the UAS industry
(e.g., limited R&D funding).
Discussion
The presentation highlighted how, even though there are
some commonalities in terms of UAS standards, each country
or region has specific operational needs to be addressed.
There seems to be a worldwide consensus on the need for
international collaboration so as to progress the UAS industry
on a global scale.
AUSTRALIAN DOD -
AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE UAS ROADMAP
Peter Maguire, Director Aerospace Systems Analysis and
Lead of the UAS Planning Team, DoD, provided an
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overview of the Australian Defence UAS Roadmap. The
Australian Defence vision for UAS is that they ". ..will
provide a flexible, cost-effective means for Defence to extend
integrated sovereign capability in key activities across the
spectrum of operations. " The Roadmap provides direction
and guidance so as to meet this vision and defines the
following implementation priorities:
1) Ensure the success~ful introduction of
systems/capabilities already in service.
2) Ensure the successful exploitation of
capabilities we introduce.
3) Explore opportunities where UAS, technologies
or new approaches to capability inputs have
demonstrated advantages.
4) Explore and research novel opportunities in
UAS, technologies, and fundamental inputs to
Defence capability.
The key challenges identified by the Roadmap include:
1) UAS Reliability - UAS are not as reliable as
their manned counterparts so there is a need to
define applicable design standards.
2) UAS Signatures - smaller UAS are inherently
difficult for other users to acquire visually or by
radar. From a mission capability perspective,
this could be considered an advantage; however,
from the perspective of peace-time operations
alongside other airspace users, this is a
disadvantage.
3) Situational Awareness - Other users cannot
easily detect UAS, and UAS cannot easily avoid
other users and the need for collision avoidance
capability.
The Roadmap outlined a two track approach for UAS
operations. The first is to progressively expand airspace
access for current systems (Small and Tactical UAS). This
will be achieved through:
1) Development of a set of airspace management
transition plans that detail the progressive
integration of UAS within the existing airspace
system.
2) Research and development in critical and
enabling technologies and associated
procedures.
The second and parallel activity is to define appropriate
standards that do not conflict or hinder current and future
Defence operational requirements.
The role of UAS in the ADF will expand dramatically
over the coming years and the roadmap will be key to
addressing the issues facing Defence UAS operations.
Defence acknowledges that many of the solutions will only
come about through collaboration with al stakeholders.
Discussion
The development of an Australian Defence UAS Roadmap
clearly indicates that a significant vision for UAS exists
within Australian Defence Force. The presentation highlights
the common standards problem and that collaboration is key
to successful and timely UAS deployment within Australia.
ACPA - ADF AIRWORTHINESS MANAGEMENT
Squadron Leader Ken Thomas, from the ADF ACPA
provided an overview of the Airworthiness Management of
ADF UAS. Unlike civil/commercial UAS owners and
operators, Defence has the additional responsibility of
self-regulation. As a self-regulator, Defence must ensure the
safety of the UAS in its intended roles whilst meeting both its
needs as an operator (capability, serviceability, and
availability) and as an owner (return on investment,
longevity, etc.).
To achieve this, the ADF has put in place an airworthiness
framework based on that used for conventional Defence
aircraft. The airworthiness framework encompasses the
complete management of the system and comprises two core
elements:
1) Technical Airworthiness - The regulation of the
design, production, and maintenance
operations. This is achieved through the
adaptation and application of existing
Airworthiness management, design, and
maintenance manuals/requirements.
2) Operational Airworthiness - The regulation of
flying operations and the overall assessment of
the risk.
The key issues concerning the regulation of UAS under
the existing ADF airworthiness framework are:
1) The definition of Equivalent Levels of Safety
(ELOS) for UAS-based on the levels of risk
manned aircraft (of similar size or category)
present to people and property on the ground
and to other aircraft.
2) The definition of regulations that encompass the
entire UAS and not just the air-vehicle.
3) The application of existing regulations to UAS.
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4) The definition of a categorisation scheme which
takes into account the wide range of UAS
characteristics and operating environments.
Based on the principle of an ELOS, two airworthiness
management categories of UAS were defined. The categories
were defined considering the level of risks, the capability,
and roles and environment of the UAS. These categories are:
1) Category]I UAS - A UAS when operating in the
intended roles and environment, is a system
whose consequence of catastrophic failure can
reasonably be expected to result in death or
serious injury, or significant damage to
property,
2) Category 2 UAS - A UAS when operating in the
intended roles and environment; a system whose
consequence of catastrophic failure can
reasonably be expected not to result in death or
serious injury or significant damage to property.
Discussion
Again, many of the challenges faced by Defence are
common to those faced by civil and commercial UAS
stakeholders. Defence does have a unique position in that it
has the additional responsibility of self-regulation.
Self-regulation does not remove Defence's regulatory (e.g.,
Chicago Convention, Defence Act, etc.), or societal (e.g.,
ethical) obligations in assuring the safe operation of UAS.
However, it does provide flexibility in how Defence chooses
to manage the safety of UAS.
There are a number of challenges in the adaptation and
application of existing regulatory frameworks to UAS. One
particular challenge is the capacity of the existing framework
to accommodate the diversity in UAS design, capability, and
operations whilst meeting the needs of the ADF as a UAS
operator and owner.
The ADF has adopted a risk management approach by
defining UAS management categories based on the level of
risk. These categories facilitate flexibility in the application
of regulatory processes and standards to UAS. Experiences in
the application of this management approach may assist
stakeholders in the development of a suitable regulatory
framework for civil/commerci al UAS.
DGTA - TECHNICAL AIRWORTHINESS
MANAGEMENT
Mark Wade from the ADF Directorate General Technical
Airworthiness (DGTA) went into further detail on the ADF's
technical airworthiness program. The ADF has grown its
concept of UAS airworthiness through its involvement in a
number of programs including Kalkara, Guardian CL-327,
Global Hawk, Mariner, and several small UAS acquisitions
and leases. The DGTA published its first UAV design
requirements in 1999. The design requirements were based
on the configuration of the aircraft, its intended role, and
operating environment. These requirements included:
1) Basic design requirements for every ADF UAS;
2) Additional requirements if used near other
aircraft; and
3) Additional requirements if used near/over
populous areas.
This airworthiness approach established the foundation for
the management of technical airworthiness for recent UAS.
The unique configuration, role, and operating environment of
a number of UAS has helped to evolve this airworthiness
framework. These UAS include the Global Hawk,
Aerosonde, Skylark, ScanEagle, and Mariner UAS.
The DGTA is now using this experience in the
management of future Defence UAS capabilities such as the
I-View 250, and the systems selected under JP-66 and
AIR7000.
Discussion
The Defence's ability to trade technical airworthiness
against operational airworthiness has given flexibility in the
management of Defence UAS. Such flexibility may not exist
under the proposed civilian regulatory framework. Even
though Civil UAS face additional airworthiness
considerations, stakeholders can benefit from the maturity of
the Defence's airworthiness program.
SUMMUARY
A large number of UAS operations are being conducted
globally despite difficulties in obtaining operational
approvals. Conditions of current approvals and precautionary
regulations inhibit the full exploitation of UAS capabilities.
The absence of a prescriptive regulatory process has
provided UAS stakeholders (both civil/commercial and state)
with greater flexibility in their proposed risk management
processes to meet current operational requirements (i.e.,
CASRi0l). This has resulted in a variety of airworthiness
approaches, and, in some instances, a duplication of efforts.
It is thought that through greater stakeholder collaboration
and sharing of operational and regulatory experiences, that
current challenges facing the industry can be overcome. The
unique aspects of the Australian operational environment are
likely to continue to support UAS deployments.
NEW TECHNOLOGY THEME
The new technology theme contained presentations on
topics related to collision avoidance, vision-based techniques
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and limitations, UAS Risk Analysis and operational risk
management, trajectory management, and Air-Ground
trajectory synchronization, and sense-and-avoid using radar
technologies.
BOEING AUSTRALIA - RADAR TRACKING OF UAS
The first presentation of this session from Michael Wilson
from Advanced Unmanned Systems Boeing Australia was on
the use of radars to track UAVs. The argument is that the
See-and-Avoid principle serves a number of important
functions in the Australian air traffic system; however, while
it undoubtedly prevents many collisions, the principle is far
from reliable.
Some of the limitations of the see-and-avoid function
include: those of the human visual system, the varying level
of demand on the pilot in performing cockpit tasks, and
various physical and environmental conditions. These, and
many other factors, combine to make the see-and-avoid
function an uncertain method of maintaining traffic
separation.
One solution proposed to address some of these issues is
the use of radar onboard aircraft to remotely detect, locate,
and track potential target objects within a specified region of
coverage. The radar system proposed to be used onboard
aircraft is similar to the low-powered marine systems
commonly used to monitor bird migration or for applications
in monitoring the integrity of important structures (power
lines, turbines, etc.). These types of radars have a detection
range of up to 6 nm with coverage of 3600 in azimuth. The
radar system has the potential to provide real-time automatic
detection and tracking that can be displayed to the operator
(or pilot).
Another solution proposed was to use the radar system as
a portable ground-based air traffic detection radar. This
concept would provide radar separation services only within
the small operating footprint of the UAV (e.g., within
CTAF-R terminal airspace). All aircraft operating within the
vicinity of the UAV would be identified by the UAV
ground-based radar operator and be provided a separation
service via radio.
Discussion
Boeing Australia is planning to operate a number of
unmanned systems over the next 10 years and will seek to
overcome the challenges of "see-and-avoid" in the vicinity
of existing airfields in segregated and non-segregated
airspace.
Boeing Australia realises the importance of developing
and introducing technology and operational procedures and is
working closely with a number of partners to investigate the
feasibility of a trial system.
The potential use and introduction of a low-cost radar,
together with other see-and-avoid technologies and
capabilities, will assist with the routine operation of UAS in
the Australian civil airspace system.
BOEING RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY, EUROPE
Miguel Villaplana, from Advanced Trajectory
Technologies, Boeing Research and Technology Europe
(BR&TE) provided a detailed report on air-ground trajectory
synchronization based on the Aircraft Intent Description
Language (AIDL). BR&TE's perspective is that ATM needs
to evolve toward a more strategic, trajectory-based system
with increased levels of automation.
1) Ground-based trajectory computation (of air
traffic) aids in conflict detection and resolution,
arrival and departure management, and traffic
flow management.
2) Airborne trajectory computation, including that
for UAS aids aircraft guidance as well as
airborne separation assurance.
There are several issues with trajectory synchronisation
between the ground-based and airborne systems, these are:
1) In general, each ATM automation tool will rely
on a different Trajectory Computation
Infrastructure (TCls), tailored to specific
requirements. As a result, different TCls may
produce inconsistent trajectories for the same
flight/situation.
2) There is a lack of consistency among airborne
and ground-based trajectory predictions.
3) In order to ensure their coordinated operation,
the ground-based automation tool must have
consistent, synchronized views of the aircraft,
so that both operate on the basis of the same
trajectory.
4) Given two trajectory computation processes,
consistency of the input (aircraft intent) is
necessary to ensure consistency in the outputs.
5) The way of describing aircraft intent varies
across TCls: in general; each TCI has its own
individual input format.
Despite these issues, commonalities exist at a conceptual
level. BR&TE has developed a formal, rigorous method for
describing aircraft intent that takes advantage of such
commonalities and can serve as lingua franca for TCIs. The
Aircraft Intent Description Language (AIDL) can support
aircraft intent-based air-ground synchronization through the
use of a reduced set of instructions (the AIDL alphabet), any
possible aircraft operation could be formally specified in
such a way that the ensuing aircraft motion is determined
unambiguously.
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A common aircraft intent language is seen as a key step
toward the reconciliation of different trajectory computation
infrastructures. The formal language structure of the AIDL
captures the fundamental elements associated in the
formulation of aircraft intent, providing a common standard
to which any TCI can map.
BR&TE proposes the use of AIDL as a standard means to
describe aircraft intent. Aircraft intent is an unambiguous
description of how the aircraft is to be operated within a
time-frame. At a lower level, AWDL it is the abstraction of the
instructions issued by the pilotIFMS to manage the aircraft
motion and a key input to the trajectory computation process.
Discussion
The proposed AWDL could serve as the basis to
synchronize the views on the future UAS and other aircraft
trajectory held by air and ground trajectory-based automation
systems. Air-ground synchronization based on the AWDL
could potentially allow the seamldess integration of UAVs in a
trajectory-based ATM environment - only time will tell.
CSIRO - UAS FOR INFRASTRUCTURE INSPECTION
Torsten Merz from CSIRO/ARCAA discussed the
challenges of developing a mini-helicopter UAS for
infrastructure inspection. Applications include the inspection
of power lines, cooling towers, or to assess damage to
buildings due to weather. The project focuses on improving
the safety and efficiency of such inspections, providing
flexible and responsive deployment, and conducting research
on dependability and autonomy. The research endeavours to
allow fully autonomous inspections, in the sense that a
domain expert is only required to provide high-level inputs
(which relaxes the requirements on the communication link).
The main challenges for the project are in addressing the
dependability of the UAS mechanical, electrical and software
systems, limited payload, power and flight time, and UAS
autonomy. "Dependability of a computing system is its
ability to deliver service that can justifiably be trusted" [4],
and can be achieved with either fault avoidance (prevention
of faults with suitable design and quality control) or fault
acceptance (tolerance of faults through error detection and
system recovery).
Some of the challenges in the automation process involve:
1) Manoeuvring in an unknown environment and
avoidance of unknown obstacles,
2) Unpredictable wind gusts, thermals, and
vortices,
3) Limited navigational aids (GPS may not always
be available, no artificial landmarks, beacons,
etc.)
4) Forced landing and emergency flight modes.
Some of the operational challenges include:
1) Flight testing of a possibly hazardous vehicle
with no emergency stop,
2) Complex deployment and operational
procedures,
3) An uncontrollable environment,
4) Expense and time to rebuild after crashes, and
5) Airworthiness, regulations, and public
acceptance.
To address the regulatory requirements, CSIRO has
adopted a progressive approach. Flight tests are currently
being conducted on a small UAS over non-populous areas,
below 400 feet AGL and at a distance greater than 3NM from
aerodromes and outside CTRs. Current operations are also
restricted to daytime, VMC conditions. Safety during an
operation is managed by the UAS controller who ensures the
UAS remains within visual range and maintains a safe
distance from third-party people and property.
Discussion
The development of dependable UAS is a significant
challenge, not only for CSIRO but the greater UAS
community. The automation and operational challenges
experienced by CSIRO are not unique to their application and
demonstrate the lack of maturity of UAS technology. The
application proposed by CSIRO is technically and
operationally complex. The solutions developed to realise
this complex application will have significant benefits for all
UAS operations and applications.
QUTIARCAA - DEVELOPMENT OF
UAS RISK ANALYSIS TOOLS
Reece Clothier, a PhD researcher at ARCAA/QUT,
provided an update on the development of risk analysis tools
for UAS operations. The presentation emphasised the need
for objective reasoning to support the development of
effective risk management policy for UAS.
In order to develop appropriate regulations, stakeholders
need an appreciation of the risks. The problem comes in that
it is not possible to gain sufficient and timely knowledge of
the risks through real-life operations alone (regulations are in
place to prevent such hazardous events occurring). A solution
to this is to utilise risk modelling and simulation tools.
The primary focus of the research is to provide an
analytical appreciation of the risks presented to people and
property on the ground, so as to:
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1) Support the definition of airworthiness
certification categories which take into
consideration the nature of the operation and the
environment over-flown;
2) Understand the effectiveness of different
operational and technology-based mitigation
techniques to manage the risks presented to
people and property on the ground; and
3) Provide inputs to and support the development
of decision aid tools such as mission planning
systems.
An overview of the causal modelling and simulation
framework was provided. The results obtained from the
analysis of a case-study mission scenario based on the recent
Mariner UAS flight trials were also presented. The analysis
used geographical population data and aircraft failure models
to evaluate the risk presented to individuals on the ground.
The evaluation used the published flight path for the Mariner
UAS on approach to RAAF Base Edinburgh and determined
that the risks presented by the flight were well under the
safety benchmarks currently exhibited by human-piloted
aviation. The analysis was useful in identifying a number of
high risk areas in the flight plan, and thus, could be used to
better direct risk mitigation efforts (e.g., the development of
curved approach paths).
The analysis of the case-study scenario demonstrated the
effectiveness of even simple risk analysis techniques in the
risk management of UAS operations. Results were also
presented on the development of multi-criteria mission
planning tools [5] that utilise the risk modelling and
simulation environment being developed.
Discussion
The need for suitable standards and regulations for UAS
has been an overwhelming theme for the workshop. It is
essential that the development of regulations is an objective
and risk-informed process. Such risk assessment tools could
play a significant part in reducing the ambiguity in current
regulations (i.e., CASR 101.025, definition of a populous
area) and assist in the development of new regulations (i.e.,
standards for system/sub-systemn reliability).
QUT/ARCAA - VISION-BASED TARGET
DETECTION
Ryan Carnie from QUT/ARCAA discussed the topic of
electro-optic (EG) target detection for UAS and presented
research on the prediction of detection performance under
varying visibility conditions using atmospheric propagation
models.
The goal of the research is to develop a
computer-vision-based system that provides a level of
situational awareness suitable for use as part of a UAS
collision avoidance system. The approach uses grey-scale
morphology and a track-before-detect algorithm to extract
target features in a manner robust to noise, followed by a
series of higher-level algorithms based on properties such as
feature motion, size, and chromacity to identify genuine
collision threats.
The results of field trials were presented, demonstrating
the detection of a Cessna 172 target aircraft at a distance of
6.5 km (3.5 nmi). This represents a 35-40% improvement
(distance-wise) on the measured performance of an alerted
human observer [6]. The trials were preformed with the
target aircraft amongst heavy cloud clutter. Also presented
was an overview of current research focussing on the impact
of varying atmospheric conditions on algorithm performance
and using an understanding of atmospheric scattering to
provide more effective discrimination against false alarms.
Discussion
The requirement for a non-cooperative collision avoidance
capability for UAS operations is well-known throughout the
industry. While other technologies, such as radar, may
provide situational awareness in a wider range of operating
conditions, EG sensors will likely fill an important niche due
to their passive nature and close analogy to the human visual
system. Understanding the effect that varying visibility
conditions have on target appearance and subsequent EO
detection performance will likely play an important role in
developing future standards.
CAE AUSTRALIA - UAS MISSION TEAM TRAINING
Michael McGarity, CAE Australia discussed Unmanned
Vehicle Systems Training and how to conduct training of a
UAS Mission Team. According to McGarity, UAS crew
training generally centred on the platform and this bias can
lead to deficiencies in training. Training must enable UAS
crews to fully exploit the capabilities of the UAS and
subsequently maximise the operational and mission
performance of the system in its role.
Training of UAS operators concentrates on the platform
level which successfully addresses issues of platform
operation but does not go beyond the operational conversion
level, and informational and inter-actional complexity. In
addition, most UAS training programs do not address
operational tactics that are unique to UAS.
The training of UAS mission teams should consider the
following aspects:
1) Emphasising the UAS operation from a mission
team perspective and support training in all
applicable roles.
2) Emphasising the joint operation of UAS with
other aircraft and operational units, and support
the development of joint tactics and doctrine.
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3) Provide training in an immersive C2 / C41SR
environment.
Training for command staff in charge of UAS should
cover:
1) The capabilities and limitations in the operation
and performance of UAS.
2) The use of the UAS not only as a "Sensor" but
also as an "Effector" - use of weapons by the
UAS /UCAV.
3) The integration of the UAS with other
air/surface surveillance assets (TSR / ISTAR).
4) Mission rehearsal in a synthetic environment to
provide opportunities for operational support,
such as mission planning and rehearsal.
Another aspect related to UAS training is the crew
selection dilemma. The current approach is that long-time
operators of the UAS have already decided on the entry
requirements for a UAS operator and it makes sense to
replicate what has worked successfully for existing
operations. However for services new to operating the UAS,
there is a dilemma in choosing the "right" type of operator(s).
CAE proposes a modular approach to UAV training, the
following modules are considered:
1) Basic training: grounds school and UAS
operations theory.
2) Conversion training: flight training, GCS
Training Standard Procedures, Emergency
Procedures, VFR Operations, IFR Operations,
Instrument Rating, Simulator Check Rides,
UAV Check Rides.
3) Basic OPS Training: relates to sensor theory,
sensor training, target recognition training, EW
training, threat evasion, weapons theory,
military operations.
4) Full mission training: mission planning, sensor
operations, CRM training (IP, P0, and MC),
surveillance mission profiles (TUAV),
surveillance mission profiles (MALE), night
and weather operations.
5) Combat mission training: affiliation training
with other platforms, systems, and units, close
air support FAC training, SIGINT / COMINT
mission training, net-centric warfare (NCW)
training, joint / combined training and exercise
participation.
Discussion
UAS are evolving rapidly in terms of their operational
potential, therefore it is important to incorporate, develop,
and define training strategies that can safely realise this
potential. UAS "users" need to realise that the crew of the
UAS are more than just "operators." With more and more
complex missions being addressed by UAS, it is imperative
that UAS training cover the full spectrum of UAV roles and
missions.
SUMMARY
There are a number of significant challenges facing the
integration of UAS into the existing airspace system, some of
which have been discussed previously. It is clear that more
research is needed to address many of these challenges.
It is important to acknowledge that the challenges facing
UAS can be technical (e.g., developing systems,
technologies, and new capabilities) and/or non-technical
(e.g., regulatory, natural, airspace, social, and political) in
nature. The focus of many research efforts have been on
addressing the technological challenges to overcome issues
such as sense-and-avoid, or insufficient system reliability.
However the technical and non-technical aspects are often
inseparable. It is essential that technical research address the
many non-technical aspects of the problem. Failure to
address such issues will present an obstacle to the practical
realisation of a solution to a technical challenge.
Some of the primary issues requiring further and ongoing
research include:
1) Research into the issues concerned with the
human element of a UAS system, maintenance,
and operation. This includes research into
Human Machine Interface (HMI), Crew
Resource Management (CRM), and training.
Providing a better understanding of such issues
can have many practical outcomes, including:
the development of operator training programs,
maintenance practices, and the definition of
crew licensing standards.
2) Research into different UAS operational
concepts and the potential impacts they have on
the existing operational environment. For
example, simulating the operation of UAS
within different airspace environments to
evaluate factors such as risk of midair collision
or ATC workload. This research can potentially
support the development of requirements on
technical systems and provide an input to
policy-making.
3) Research into the social aspects of the UAS
integration problem. These aspects include
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Identifying and evaluating the concerns of key
stakeholders such as the public and other
airspace users. Understanding these aspects will
assist in the development of strategies to better
manage stakeholder concerns, and,
subsequently, foster a more receptive
stakeholder climate.
4) Research into the key technologies which would
support increased operational flexibility,
predominantly those which address regulatory
requirements. These can include: technologies
improving system reliability (propulsion
systems, etc.), sense-and-avoid, and flight
termination systems. This research should also
investigate the standards and procedures needed
to support the implementation of such
technologies.
5) Research into the technologies which support
increased UAS capability, particularly in those
which improve mission performance. This can
include research into the m-iniaturisation of
sensors and payloads, improving overall system
efficiency, and increasing the level of
automation onboard UAS to reduce the
dependency on communication links and
operator workload. Increasing the operational
flexibility and mission capability of UAS will
assist in the continuation of the industry in
current and new applications.
CONCLUSION
The future of UAS workshop brought together a
cross-section of the international UAS community for
discussions on the critical issues of standards and regulations,
operational experiences and airworthiness, and new enabling
technologies. The three themes covered in the workshop have
been summarised in their respective sections and discussions
have been given on the presented material. The workshop
fostered collaboration of key stakeholders on important
issues and provided an environment for the development of
solutions that will ultimately progress the UAS industry
internationally and within Australia.
One fundamental observation drawn from this workshop is
the "chicken and egg" relationship between the operation and
regulation of UAS in the current aviation environment. That
is, UAS operations are currently limited by the lack of
prescriptive regulations and the development of regulations
still requires the demonstration of UAS capabilities.
It took approximately 20 years from the birth of aviation
before the air commerce act of 1926 was set in place. This
landmark legislation was implemented at the request of the
[6] Camie, Ryan J., Walker, Rodney A. and Corke. Peter 1., (2006),
Image Processing Algorithms for UAV Sense and Avoid,
In Proceedings 2006 IEEE Conference on Robotics
and Automation, Orlando, Florida. A
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aviation industry who believed that the full commercial
potential of the aeroplane could not be realised without
Federal Government intervention to improve and maintain
safety standards. The UAS industry now faces the difficult
task of integrating a fundamentally new concept of aviation
into an existing highly regulated environment - this was not
the case at the birth of aviation. At that time, the aviation
industry was able to rely on a progression of operational
experiences to develop regulations that have been updated
and further defined over the last 80 years.
The difficult task facing the UAS industry today can only
be solved with the collective effort of groups, both technical
and lobbyist, from around the world. The diversity of these
approaches will assist in finding the optimal global solution,
so long as the international efforts are collaborative and
communicate in a coordinated manner.
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